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Abstract 
 
An e-Social Science infrastructure generally has 
security requirements to protect their restricted 
resources or services. As a widely accepted 
authentication and authorization technology, 
Shibboleth supports the sharing of resources on inter-
institutional federation. Guanxi is an open source 
implementation of the Shibboleth protocol and 
architecture. In this paper, we propose a security 
infrastructure for e-social science based on the Guanxi 
Shibboleth. This security infrastructure presents two 
main features. Firstly, Guanxi Shibboleth is integrated 
into the user-friendly Sakai collaborative and learning 
environment which provides an ideal place for users to 
access a variety of federation resources in line with the 
Shibboleth authentication model. Secondly, PERMIS 
technology is used to enhance the authorization 
mechanisms thus enabling a policy-driven, role-based, 
fine-grained access control. As a result, the security 
infrastructure presents the advantages of Guanxi 
Shibboleth, PERMIS and Sakai, and it has been 
applied to e-Social Science application. We believe 
this security infrastructure provides a promising 
authentication and authorization solution for e-social 
science applications as well as applications in other 
domains. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The e-Infrastructure for Social Science [1] is a 
project funded by UK Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) which leverages Grid technology [2] 
to build an e-infrastructure to provide integrated access 
to a variety of resources of social science research, 
including datasets, tools, services and easy-to-use user 
environments. Security underpins the e-Infrastructure 
for the social sciences as it is one of the foundations of 
any working Grid infrastructure. As an important 
activity of the e-Infrastructure for Social Science 
project, we will build a security infrastructure which 
enables secure access to the e-social science resources.  
The e-Infrastructure allows resources to be shared 
between members of virtual organizations (VOs). 
However, if an organization is to allow its resources to 
be shared amongst its VO members, it needs to be able 
to determine who is authorized to access these 
resources in which ways, and who is not. Access 
control rests on the two related concepts of 
authentication (establishing the identity of an entity, 
e.g., a user) and authorization (determining the level of 
access to an authenticated entity) which are two 
fundamental but critical issues in constructing the 
security infrastructure for the e-Infrastructure. 
There have been continuous efforts in the 
development of authentication and authorization 
technologies in the Grid communities.  
 
• Typical early efforts like Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) [3] in the Globus Toolkit [4] 
implement security infrastructures using Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) [5, 6] based authentication and 
Grid-map file based authorization. This approach 
has been criticized, mainly because it lacks 
scalability and flexibility in coping with 
dynamically changing users, rights and permission 
in the scenarios of large scale VOs.   
• Thereafter a variety of advance authentication and 
authorization infrastructures have been developed, 
such as Athens [7], Shibboleth [8], CAS [9], 
VOMS [10] and PERMIS [11]. A core idea behind 
these security infrastructures is that user attributes 
or roles are used for expressing user’s privileges. 
However, these security infrastructures are 
predominantly used by different Grid communities 
and thus have interoperability issues. In addition, 
each of these solutions has its functionality focus, 
either on authentication or authorization, and more 
efforts are required to provide an integrated 
solution.  
• GridShibPERMIS [12] and VPMan [13] are two 
pioneer projects conducted by UK universities 
aiming to provide an integrated and advanced 
security infrastructure. The GridShibPERMIS 
project integrates the Internet2 Shibboleth 
implementation [14] with the PERMIS 
infrastructure to authorize Grid jobs running with 
Globus Toolkit in order to provide policy driven 
role-based access control decision making to Grid 
jobs. The VPMan project integrates two advanced 
authorization infrastructures, i.e., VOMS and 
PERMIS (especially the privilege management 
function of VOMS and the authorization decision 
function of PERMIS). VPMan further seamlessly 
embeds into the Globus authorization framework, 
so that the management of grid users is made easier 
and fine grained access to resources can be 
achieved. A problem is that these infrastructures are 
restricted to working in a Globus environment, but 
in practice many applications do not work within 
this environment. An integrated authentication and 
authorization infrastructure is expected to protect 
non Globus-enabled resources. 
 
We present a security infrastructure that leverages 
Guanxi Shibboleth technology as authentication 
mechanism and PERMIS technology as authorization 
mechanism. Guanxi Shibboleth enables the setup of 
federations of collaborating institutions that trust each 
other to authenticate their users properly. Furthermore, 
Guanxi Shibboleth technology is an attribute based 
system, and it implements secure transfer of users' 
attributes from users’ home sites to remote service 
providers, and these attributes can be fed to appropriate 
authorization infrastructures, in our case, PERMIS, to 
make authorization decisions. This indicates that 
Guanxi Shibboleth provides the technical basis and 
linkage for the provision of fine-grained access control 
in a Grid environment: when integrated with PERMIS 
authorization technology, our Guanxi Shibboleth based 
security infrastructure can realize fine-grained access 
control for distributed resources or services, and these 
resources are not necessarily working in a Globus 
environment. 
As a result, our security infrastructure offers 
scalable and flexible user authentication brought about 
by Guanxi Shibboleth. Meanwhile, making use of the 
user attribute assignment function of Guanxi 
Shibboleth, the integrated PERMIS provides policy-
driven, role-based, multi-grained authorization for 
access to and usage of the e-Infrastructure. Besides, we 
employ Sakai as the principal user portal which 
provides a user-friendly environment to access various 
resources. In this paper, we focus on the architecture 
design of the security infrastructure. In Section 2, we 
introduce the background of PERMIS and Sakai 
technologies as well as the motivations for adopting 
them. Section 3 focuses on discussing the issues 
involved with the architecture design of the security 
infrastructure, including the Guanxi architecture, the 
integration of Guanxi and Sakai, as well the integration 
of Guanxi and PERMIS. In Section 4 we discuss a use 
case supported by the security infrastructure and the 
implementation issues involved. Finally Section 5 
concludes the paper and gives our plan for future work. 
 
2. PERMIS and Sakai technologies 
 
To better understand our security infrastructure, in 
this section, we will give a brief overview of the two 
key technologies integrated into our infrastructure, i.e., 
PERMIS and Sakai. The advantages of these 
technologies will be discussed and the motivations of 
adopting these technologies will be addressed. 
 
2.1. PERMIS authorization 
 
A number of authorization technologies and 
infrastructures have been applied to Grid and 
distributed computing, typical examples include CAS, 
VOMS, Akenti and PERMIS. PERMIS, i.e., PrivilEge 
and Role Management Infrastructure Standard is an 
advanced authorization infrastructure. It differs from 
other Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
authorization systems in that access control decisions 
are made based upon users’ attributes, not just upon 
their organizational roles as in conventional RBAC. 
This authorization model is named as attribute based 
access control (ABAC). PERMIS can support the 
ABAC model as the basis of the infrastructure is user 
attributes stored in Attribute Certificates (ACs) [15]: 
administrators issue ACs to users which reflect the 
users’ attributes and roles, and service providers 
publish policies that detail the access rights granted to 
each role or attribute. In other words, service providers 
determine a user’s privileges and access right based on 
the user’s attributes issued by administrators. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the PERMIS 
authorization decision engine consists of the Policy 
Decision Point (PDP) and the Credential Validation 
Service (CVS). Both of the components are policy 
driven. When a user requires access to a PERMIS 
protected service, the PERMIS authorization model 
can be simply described as follows: 
 
(1) The Policy Decision Point (PDP) informs the 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) about the 
credentials required for access. The PEP then 
collects the user credentials from the credential 
provider. 
(2) The Credential Validation Service (CVS) of the 
PERMIS authorization engine will validate the user 
attribute assignments based on its set of policies in 
the form of “this authority is trusted to assign these 
attributes to this group of users”. As a result, only 
those attributes that can be validated by the 
credential validation rules in the policy will be 
recognized as valid.  
(3) After validation by the CVS, the user attributes are 
passed to the PDP which takes the decision based 
on its policy in the form of “users with this set of 
attributes are allowed this type of access to this 
resource, providing that the following conditions 
are met”. As a result, the user is either granted or 
denied access to the service requested. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Components and Authorization 
Model of PERMIS 
 
Comparing with other authorization infrastructures, 
PERMIS offers a couple of advantages highlighted as 
follows: 
 
• In PERMIS, user attributes are held in attribute 
certificates which describe a user’s rights and the 
target services then read the user’s AC to see if the 
user is allowed to perform the action being 
requested. This approach de-couples users’ 
privileges from their local identity and thus enables 
scalability and flexibility of access control, 
especially for large-scale VOs with a big number of 
user, service providers and access requests.  
• PERMIS is a policy-driven authorization system in 
that a service provider makes authorization 
decisions using policies or rules. Service providers 
have the flexibility to write multi-grained and 
conditional access policies on the basis of user 
attributes, either in XML format or X.509 signed 
certificate. 
• Finally, PERMIS can be easily integrated with 
attribute based authentication systems in the 
provision of user attributes to the PERMIS 
authorization engine. This indicates that service 
providers only need to specify the access control 
policy, and leave PERMIS to enforce their policy 
on their behalf. This reduces service provider’s 
authorization workload significantly. 
 
It should be noted that PERMIS has been developed 
with the primary focus on policy based authorization 
decision functionality, and thus has concentrated much 
less on the privilege assignment function in which users 
are assigned to roles and attributes although PERMIS 
does provide its own tools to make attribute 
assignment. Indeed this shows the flexibility brought 
by PERMIS, i.e., any system is allowed to make 
attribute assignments, but PERMIS has the validation 
control on which attributes are trusted from which 
authority.  
 
2.2. Sakai 
 
Sakai [16] is an integrated Collaboration and 
Learning Environment (CLE) that can be used for a 
variety of purposes such as teaching, research, learning 
and so on.  Sakai provides an open standard portal 
framework that hosts extensive built-in online 
collaboration and learning tools — discussion boards, 
email discussion list, announcements, chat room, grade 
book, resource area for any files you would like to 
share including web links to external sites, calendar, 
wiki, and much more. Sakai has been used or extended 
by more and more communities as their Web-based 
environment, e.g. the Sakai Virtual Research 
Environment (VRE) [17].  
In our project, we intend to make the Sakai portal 
the principal user interface of our e-infrastructure for 
social science. Through the Sakai portal, users can 
access various tools provided by Sakai as well as 
distributed resources or services integrated into Sakai. 
Most importantly, the security infrastructure we present 
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will be integrated into the Sakai system and applied to 
user authentication and access control of remote 
resources or services.  
 
3. Architecture of the security 
infrastructure 
 
The goal of our security infrastructure is to integrate 
Guanxi Shibboleth implementation and PERMIS to 
provide authentication and authorization mechanism. 
The infrastructure will work in the Sakai environment. 
In this section, we will discuss the architecture of the 
security infrastructure. Firstly we describe the Guanxi 
Shibboleth technology. Then we will address the 
integration of Guanxi with Sakai and PERMIS, and 
outline the overall architecture of the security 
infrastructure. 
 
3.1. Guanxi Shibboleth 
 
Developed by the UHI Millennium Institute (UK) in 
partnership with the University of Oxford and the 
University of Leeds (UK), Guanxi [18] is an open 
source implementation of the Shibboleth protocol and 
architecture (another popular implementation is the 
Shibboleth System [14] provided by Internet2 
Middleware Initiative). As an authentication and 
authorization infrastructure to support inter-
institutional sharing of resources, Guanxi Shibboleth 
presents a couple of features in terms of:  
 
• User authentication 
Guanxi Shibboleth manages user authentication at 
Grid VO or user federation layer, and ‘glues’ various 
local authentication systems at users’ home institution, 
allowing a user to use the local authentication 
mechanisms to achieve federation wide authentication. 
In other words, the Guanxi Shibboleth infrastructure 
introduces a two-layer authentication scheme and is 
capable of supporting a wide range of heterogeneous 
authentication methods, and allows a user to gain 
authentication using local authentication systems. More 
importantly, a user can achieve single-sign on, that is, 
using the same local login information to access 
various cross-domain resources. 
 
• Attribute management 
Guanxi Shibboleth manages user attributes 
assignment by means of its Attribute Authority. More 
importantly, it implements the SAML (Security 
Assertion Markup Language) protocol [19] for the 
secure  passing of user information between users’ 
institutions and resources. This enables fine grained 
authorization which is the requirements of complex 
systems like Grid environments. 
 
 
Figure 2. Guanxi Architecture and 
Components 
 
The Guanxi Shibboleth architecture is composed of 
three main components: an Identity Provider (IdP), a 
Service Provider (SP) and an optional Where Are You 
From (WAYF) service. The architecture is summarized 
in Figure 2. 
 
3.1.1. Identity Provider. The Guanxi Identity Provider 
(IdP) is a modular system installed at the user’s home 
organization. The main function of IdP is to perform 
user authentication as well as to manage user attributes. 
Guanxi IdP provides an Authenticator interface, and 
one can write its implementations so that IdP can work 
with the alternative backend authentication systems like 
Sakai, LDAP, and FlatFile. Guanxi IdP also provides 
an attributor mechanism, making IdP associated with 
multiple attributes providers to realize aggregation of 
attributes from diverse institutional data stores. 
 
3.1.2 Service Provider. The Guanxi Service Provider 
(SP) uses a radically different architecture to the 
Internet2 SP default implementation. In the Guanxi 
model, the SP is split into two co-operating entities, 
known as an Engine and a Guard. The Engine, also 
known as the SAML Engine, is responsible for 
communicating with federation entities such as IdPs 
and handles all SAML communication and processing 
on behalf of a community of Guards that are associated 
with that Engine. More specifically: 
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• Guard  
The Guard is a lightweight SP module that is 
designed to sit in front of a service (or resource) and 
trap requests to the service. Guards do not normally 
deal with SAML as they delegate all SAML processing 
to their Engine. It's the Guard's job to block access to a 
service until attributes arrive from the Engine, which 
can then be passed to the service. The Guard plays no 
further role in service access beyond this blocking role. 
What happens to access, based on the attributes, is up 
to the service. This means Guards are very lightweight 
processes that can be easily deployed in front of 
services. 
 
• Engine 
The Engine is the SP module that takes care of all 
SAML processing and XML signature and security 
verification. It can be situated anywhere on the internet. 
Each Engine can have a community of Guards with 
which it has metadata associations and it is this 
metadata that enables the secure communications 
among the Engine and its Guards. To prevent capture 
of user attributes by rogue Guards, the Engine will use 
a Guard's metadata to verify the session that is being 
requested. Once verification is complete, the Engine 
will represent that Guard in the federation via identity 
masquerading, while the Guard will return to the 
service, there to await the arrival of attributes, obtained 
by the Engine via an IdP and sent to the Guard's 
attribute consumer service, e.g. an authorization system 
like PERMIS. 
 
3.1.3 WAYF Service. In a federation where many 
organizations share a trust relationship, the federation 
may manage a WAYF service. The WAYF provides a 
mechanism for allowing users to be forwarded to the 
correct home organization. This is normally presented 
in the form of a web page with a drop down list. Once 
the user selects an organization, the user is forwarded 
to that institution’s IdP to complete the authentication 
process. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the process of a user from 
organization 1 accessing resources (or services) hosted 
at organization 2 can be described as follows:  
 
(1) The user from organization 1 makes a request for a 
resource located on organization 2. The request will 
be trapped by the Guard which sits in front of the 
resources. 
(2) The Guard sets up WS-Callback with the SAML 
Engine situated on the federation server.  
(3) The Guard redirects the user to WAYF. WAYF will 
present a list to the user containing his/her home 
institutions and will ask to select his/her institution. 
(4) User will be redirected to his/her home institution 
to get authenticated by the Single-Sign On (SSO) 
system. 
(5) SSO replies to SAML Engine. 
(6) The SAML Engine requests attributes of the user 
from the Attribute Authority (AA) of the IdP.  
(7) The AA will look for the user attributes in the 
database and will send the required attributes to the 
SAML Engine.  
(8) The SAML Engine invokes WS-Callback to the 
Guard which retrieves user attributes.  
(9) The Guard makes access decision based on 
attributes gathered by the SAML Engine. 
 
3.2. Integration of Guanxi and Sakai 
 
Our e-infrastructure for social science project adopts 
Sakai as a one-stop user-friendly environment for users 
to access various resources or services. An issue arising 
from the adoption of Sakai is the integration of Sakai 
and Guanxi Shibboleth such that users can have the 
advantages of both systems.  
We use Guanxi Shibb Kit (GSK) [20] which is a 
tool developed by the Guanxi project to address the 
above challenge. GSK tool provides the following two 
ways to make Sakai seamlessly work with Guanxi 
system: 
 
• Sakai as a Service Provider 
GSK can work in conjunction with the main Sakai 
portal to allow users to log in to Sakai using 
Shibboleth, i.e. the GSK provides Sakai with the 
capability to be used as a Service Provider. Normal 
Sakai users are not affected as the normal 
authentication and authorization mechanisms of Sakai 
are not affected by the Guanxi Shibboleth portal. The 
Guanxi Shibboleth portal acts as a holding area for 
users while they are authenticated by their Identity 
Provider and their attributes gathered by the Guanxi 
Shibboleth portal. If their attributes match what is 
specified in the configuration of the Guanxi Shibboleth 
portal they are then promoted to a full Sakai user and 
redirected to the main Sakai portal, where they 
seamlessly join other users of the system. 
 
• Sakai as an Identify Provider 
The GSK also provides Sakai with the capability to 
be used as a Guanxi IdP, to allow Sakai to be used in 
Shibboleth federations to access Guanxi Shibboleth 
protected resources. The GSK is bundled with a 
Guanxi Authenticator and Attributor that are 
customized to work with the Sakai authentication. This 
allows the Guanxi Shibboleth functionality to delegate 
to the mechanisms Sakai is using to control 
authentication and authorization.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Security infrastructure architecture 
and integration model of Guanxi, PERMIS and 
Sakai 
 
For our case, Sakai is integrated with Guanxi mainly 
as a service provider, and Sakai has its own Guanxi 
Guard deployed. Figure 3 illustrates the integration of 
Sakai and Guanxi using GSK. Let’s look at a scenario 
that a user from organization 1 makes a request for 
resources located on organization 2 via the Sakai 
system. Please note in the Sakai environment, remote 
resources can be exposed as portlet and user can access 
resources through WSRP (Web Services for Remote 
Portlets) protocol. The generic workflow of request and 
response across the whole security infrastructure can be 
described as follows: 
 
(1) The entry point of the user’s session is the GSK 
portal, which will interact with Guanxi on behalf of 
users.  
(2) The Sakai Guard will block user’s request to the 
GSK portal, followed by the establishment of user 
authentication session. 
(3) As discussed earlier, the user will get authenticated 
by his/her IdP SSO system, which involves a series 
of interactions among the Guanxi components 
including SAML Engine, WAYF, IdP and Guard 
(please refer to Figure 2 for more details). In 
addition, the SAML Engine will request and obtain 
attributes of the user from the IdP.  
(4) After passing authentication, the user will be 
redirected to the Sakai portal which is pre-
registered with the GSK as the main Sakai entry 
point.  
(5) The user can now make a request for the resources 
represented as portlet in the Sakai. A Guard is 
deployed sitting in front of the resources located at 
organization 2. 
(6) User’s request will be captured by resource Guard. 
Then the resource Guard sets up WS-Callback with 
the SAML Engine, and in turn the SAML Engine 
sends user attributes to the resource Guard.  
 
Above we have discussed the process of user 
authentication based on Guanxi Shibboleth and further 
logon the Sakai portal to make resource request. The 
next will be the authorization phase, which will be 
discussed in the following subsection.  
Please note that the users we are talking here are 
from the participating institutions of a federation. Each 
participating institution has their own Guanxi IdP and 
backend authentication systems. For the normal Sakai 
users that may not belong to any participating 
institution, we can use the GSK function discussed 
earlier to make Sakai working as a Guanxi IdP so that 
Sakai users can request to access resources subject to 
access control policies. Especially, Sakai Authenticator 
and Sakai Attributor bundled with GSK need to be 
created and customized (see Figure 3) to work with 
Guanxi IdP: Sakai Authenticator delegates to Sakai 
authentication system (i.e., Sakai works as a backend 
authentication system), and Sakai Attributor uses Sakai 
for user information (i.e., Sakai provides information 
about users which can be further transformed or 
mapped into user attributes in the specific format of 
IdP and SAML Engine). 
 
3.3. Integration of Guanxi and PERMIS 
 
In Section 3.1 we have discussed the features of 
Guanxi Shibboleth, but Guanxi Shibboleth also has its 
weakness in that it has limited authorization 
functionality itself and thus needs to work with a 
powerful authorization system to protect resources. In 
this section, we will discuss our approach to ‘plug’ 
PERMIS into the Guanxi Shibboleth framework and 
make the two systems work seamlessly. 
The core idea behind the integration of Guanxi 
Shibboleth and PERMIS is to leverage the attribute 
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management functionality of Guanxi Shibboleth, by 
transporting user attributes as SAML attribute 
assertions from the Guanxi IdP, to PERMIS 
authorization engine. At the technical level, a context 
handler needs to be implemented as an interface 
between the resource Guard and the PERMIS 
authorization engine (as illustrated in Figure 3). 
Following up the workflow of request and response 
across the whole security infrastructure as described in 
the previous subsection, the authorization phase based 
on PERMIS will be continued as follows: 
 
(7) The context handler retrieves and extracts user 
attributes returned by resource Guard, and 
converts them into the internal format recognized 
by PERMIS.  
(8) The context handler then passes these attributes to 
the PERMIS CVS which checks if the Guanxi IdP 
is trusted to issue the attributes it has returned in 
accordance with the PERMIS policy. 
(9) The valid attributes are passed along with 
information about the user’s resource request and 
target to the PERMIS PDP. The PERMIS PDP 
makes an access control decision (either access 
granted or denied) as per the PERMIS policy, and 
this is return by the context handler to the resource 
Guard.  
(10) And finally, the resource Guard will access the 
resource if the request is granted, or simply take no 
action if the request is denied. 
 
As per the PERMIS technology, the context handler 
can accept attribute certificate in the form of X.509 to 
be returned by the Guanxi IdP. The PERMIS engine 
reads the attribute certificates and makes the 
authorization decision.  
 
4. Use case and implementation issues 
 
Geo-linking is about linking data using geographical 
attributes such as a postcode or address rather than 
using a geometry, such as the boundary of a postcode 
or a coordinate of an address. Much data is geographic 
in that it contains geographical attributes, but does not 
have the spatial geometry necessary to generate 
geographical maps. However, often spatial geometry 
does exist in auxiliary data and by linking this, it 
becomes possible to do spatial analysis and produce 
geographical maps. A Geo-Linking Service (GLS) was 
developed as a part of the Secure Access to Geospatial 
Services (SEE-GEO) project [21]. The GLS allows 
users to query the service with appropriate parameters 
about datasets, and generates output of a particular 
query. The SEE-GEO GLS implementation uses client- 
server architecture with the client being a JSR-168 
portlet.  
 
Figure 4. The GLS Framework  
 
Two major security concerns of the GLS service are 
that users may come from different institutions and the 
data being used may be confidential/restricted. The 
former issue means that it is appropriate to implement a 
federated authentication mechanism, while the later one 
requires appropriate authorization mechanisms to 
secure/access the data servers (see Figure 4). 
Furthermore, the access granted to data might be 
dependent on the date and time constraints, e.g., the 
sharing could be restricted to specific time limits such 
as the working hours of the organization. This means 
that fine-grained authorization that supports conditional 
access control is wanted. In addition, the GLS service 
is integrated into Sakai portal for a user-friendly access 
purpose.  
The security infrastructure we present in the 
previous section provides a solution and it has been 
applied to the GLS service to fulfill its security 
requirements. We have set up a testbed which consists 
of a cluster of virtual machines. On this testbed the 
GLS was deployed and the security infrastructure was 
implemented as follows: 
 
• We set up Guanxi IdP version 1.4 on two virtual 
machines representing two institutions, and these 
institutions forms a Guanxi Shibboleth federation. 
The users will be authenticated by their backend 
LDAP authentication systems.  
• We also set up Guanxi SP version 1.3 including a 
federation-wide SAML Engine on one virtual 
machine, a Sakai Guard working with the latest 
Sakai version 2.5 on one machine, as well as a 
resource Guard to protect the GLS service deployed 
on one virtual machine. Besides, the WAYF service 
version 1.2 was deployed on the same virtual 
machine as the SAML engine. 
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• The GSK tool has been deployed and configured to 
work with Sakai and Guanxi. The integration of 
Sakai and Guanxi has been achieved.  
• The open PERMIS package [22] version 4.0, an 
open source implementation of PERMIS, was 
deployed with the GLS service site. We 
implemented a context handler as interface between 
the resource Guard and PERMIS. The integration 
of Guanxi and PERMIS was accomplished.  
 
An initial set of core user attributes has been defined 
and recommended for the IdPs of each institution such 
that the PERMIS systems can subsequently use for 
authorization decisions to access the GLS service. We 
also use the policy editing tools provided by the open 
PERMIS package to write policies and rules to access 
the GLS service. The operations of the security 
infrastructure show that it works well with the GLS 
service and achieved its functionality. 
 
5. Conclusion and future work 
 
Security is a fundamental requirement in the e-
Infrastructure for the social sciences project. The 
emergence of Shibboleth and advanced authorization 
technologies like PERMIS provides a promising 
solution to address the authentication and authorization 
issues in building a security infrastructure. In this 
paper, we present an integrated security infrastructure 
that provides the advantages of both Guanxi Shibboleth 
cross-organization identity federation and attribute 
management with PERMIS policy driven role-based 
fine grained authorization. This security infrastructure 
has been implemented and applied to some use case. 
We believe that this security infrastructure will provide 
a general framework for other applications that have 
similar authentication and authorization requirements. 
On the whole, the security infrastructure presented 
in this paper is yet a concept-proof authentication and 
authorization framework, and there are still a number 
of issues to be further addressed. Basically our future 
work will be carried out in the following aspects: 
• Improvement of the security infrastructure – we will 
further address the issues such as user attribute 
management in terms of attribute definition and 
format, authorization policy management to support 
complicated policy composition, federation 
membership management and attribute assignment 
(possibly introducing VOMS technology to work 
with Guanxi Shibboleth and PERMIS), etc. 
• Application of the security infrastructure – we plan 
to apply the security infrastructure to more e-social 
sciences applications as well as other domain 
applications that have security requirements.  
• Performance study of the security infrastructure – 
we plan to set up a cross-institution federation and 
deploy our security infrastructure on a large scale 
testbed. Then we will conduct experiments to 
investigate the scalability and performance of the 
security infrastructure. This will help further 
optimization and enhancement of the security 
infrastructure. 
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